Kansas' First LEMA Order Signed

LEMA Bill Signing - Colby, KS, 2012

The 2012 Legislature passed a new law authorizing the implementation of local enhanced management areas (LEMAs).  The accompanying picture is of the LEMA bill signing in Colby follwing the Governor's ceremonial signing.  Chief engineer David Barfield is addressing the crowd, while Governor Brownback looks on (in the blue shirt over the speaker's right shoulder).

Basically, if a groundwater management district (GMD) works with local stakeholders, they can submit an enhanced management plan to the chief engineer for consideration.  If the proposal meets certain basic criteria, the chief engineer can call for public hearings on the exclusively local proposal, with the hearing process focused ONLY on the local proposal.  Following the hearings, the chief engineer has only three basic options:  1)  Approve the proposal as submitted; 2) reject the proposal in its entirety; or 3) return it with suggestions that have come up in the hearing process and must have local approval to be included.  In other words, outside ideas can't find their way into the state's final implementation order without local approval.  As I've said before, the locals may not get what they want, but they are assured of not getting what they don't want once the process gets under way.

The special management area we call SD-6 has gone through this entire process and on December 31, 2012 the chief engineer signed the state's first LEMA Order - designating this 99 square-mile area as a LEMA.  The order ended up being issued under option 1) above - it was exactly as locally proposed.

There were some anxious moments in this process.  We weren't sure the proposal would be accepted from the start based on its 5-year life span.  There are those who argued that a sunsetted LEMA may not be worth the effort.  The locals argued that the review process was flexible enough to continue the proposal, but that a 5-year trial spin was all that could be locally acceptable.  Besides, 5 years of reduced water use is better than no conservation should the plan be rejected out of the gate.

We also had some opposition to the flexibility of moving water use around within the LEMA area.  Some felt that the unrestricted movement of water use across the 20 or so miles of this area could be problematic.  We argued that only judicious amounts of water are likely to be transferred around via the flexibility we've provided, so there will not be huge supply problems created.  Moreover, we agreed to look at this issue every year in the required annual LEMA review.  If any problems crop up, we've left a mechanism to address them.

The boundaries were also contentious.  Many expressed the feeling that the entire County, or the entire GMD should have been included.  The fact that the entire County and the entire GMD are not experiencing the same degree of problematic declines seemed to have prevailed. 

We're excited to try this out and see how effective it will be for the local water users.  The total 5-year pumping cap imposed will reduce historical pumpage by about 18-20% per year for 5 years.  This should help slow the groundwater decline rate and thus extend the economic life of this portion of the Ogallala Aquifer.

About the only trepidation we have now is the specter of a lawsuit, as not everyone was equally as enthused about the design of this LEMA.  Since it's new, I guess it's possible that the law is in fact unconstitutional, or that we've applied the process improperly.  But I have bigger concerns regarding a law suit.  This new authority was consistently hailed as being the most promising local approach to groundwater problem solving in Kansas in a long time.  If we locals can't make it work, I'm afraid that the very idea of "local control" in Kansas may become questioned by State pundits more seriously than many of us would be comfortable with.  The loss of local control and serious input into groundwater issues I think will be lamented very much.  'nuff said.
  

New Groundwater Management System - China Style

WaterWired (AKA Michael Campana) just did a blog article on a new groundwater management system instituted in Qinxu, a County in Shanxi Province in China - called the Qinxu Groundwater System.  His is a very good article, complete with a video spot from the Water Channel.  I recommend you take a look at these materials before reading the rest of this article, which will be a few comments on the new China approach.

Several things hit me as I was reading about the new management system.  First, as I've said since I became manager of GMD 4 in 1977 - Groundwater management is easy - just don't pump it.   If GMD 4 had full control of all the groundwater, we could have easily had a quota system set up many years ago. The sum of all quotas could have been set to achieve any outcome desired - all the way from restoring historic groundwater levels to increasing the current decline rates as much as we wanted to.  Our problem is that in Kansas, water rights are real property rights to the use of the State's water.  I can see where the government of China can at any time allot, reallocate or adjust any or all water, but not so in Kansas.  Of course, this doesn't make either system "right" or "wrong". 

Secondly, the story from Frank van Steenbergen (that was reported on by WaterWired) states the huge dependence China has on irrigation water currently being used - half the country's wheat and one third of its corn.  His conclusion is what a disaster it would be if this area of China were to run out of water and have to replace all that production on the world grain markets.  Well, if the new Qinxu quotas are correctly sized to achieve groundwater sustainability (so they never run out of water), some percentage of that production will be lost.  My point is that nowhere in the articles does anyone talk about the total quotas relative to the amount of water having been used before the new system.  This could be nothing more than a fancy accounting system to continue the current overdrafts.  I don't think it is, but then without this information, how can I agree that it is "the solution" they say it is?

Thirdly, the system clearly tries to use price to discourage overpumping ones quota, but it doesn't seem to prohibit over use.  As grain prices rise, the incentive to over use ones allocation (to increase production) goes up as well.  As more water is used, the quotas must be reduced further.  Yes, its the tragedy of the commons again.  I have no idea what .05 Euro per unit of water really means, and the fact that everyone's units can vary between 500 and 5000 liters per unit renders these values very hazy.  Of course, all these numbers and values can be adjusted to make them highly relevant - if there is the political will, or the outright power, to do so.  I should do the math to quantify the relevance of the price to the quotas - maybe tomorrow.

Fourthly, the marketability of the units is a great feature, but it'd be even more relevant if there was a prohibition to exceeding ones' quota. Also, with groundwater, I'm thinking that trades need to be spatially restricted to some degree.  Otherwise an inappropriate amount of groundwater could be used in too small an area - causing excessive declines or impairments.  Maybe this system addresses this, but it wasn't stated.    

Fifthly, there is mention of 60 telemetry observation wells that track groundwater levels, but no mention of how these are used.  Presumably the quotas would be adjusted periodically to reflect the water table responses shown by these 60 wells to the previous years pumpage??  It is awfully hard to efficiently operate production agriculture without knowing what all your inputs are.  Here in NW Kansas cropping rotations are often used to take advantage of nutrient inputs, fallowing periods and marketing plans, and they plan 3 to 5 years out.  Water quotas that might change within this time period would reduce the overall efficiency of these operations.  Of course, the quota system could be designed over longer periods to accommodate these needs - it's just not covered.

In conclusion, it might sound like I'm being critical of the new system, but I'm really not.  It could work, but it could easily fail as well.  As usual, the devil, and the real impacts, are always in the details.  The bottom line is that to slow the decline rates, consumptive water use must be reduced, and that reduction will mean less economic opportunity - always a touchy issue to attempt.  Comments?

Update (November 12, 2012):  I did the math on the prices and they are:  at .44 Yuan (the base rate per unit (.05 Euro / .06 $US) and the largest unit at 5000 liters, an AF of water will cost the user $14.81.  For the highest rate of .55 Yuan (assessed for those exceeding a quota) that same AF will cost $22.14.  Has price been appropriately applied in this system?

P.S.  If anyone would like to double check my prices math, please let me know if you find a different answer.  

RMA to Pilot Limited Irrigation Insurance in SD-6 HPA

Just got the news that Risk Management Agency (RMA) is gearing up to launch their long-awaited limited irrigation insurance program in our SD-6 Local Enhanced Management Area (LEMA) - in 2013.  I've blogged about this developing program earlier (here) when it was being considered for a 3-state (Kansas, Colorado and Nebraska) roll-out.

This program is being designed to provide irrigated producers a proportional level of crop insurance for restricted irrigated cropping patterns - only for irrigated corn and soybeans initially (as these are the only two crops they have the yield to water use data for at this time).  Currently crop insurance is available only for fully irrigated crops, or, dryland crops, but nothing in between.  The thinking has been that if producers could get fair (proportional) insurance coverage (more risk management options) they would be more likely to limit irrigation and conserve water.  Of course, this protection gets even more important when these same producers are required to restrict pumpage.  The reduced coverages would be easier on the insurance companies, as well. 

A related issue is the effect of restricted irrigation (mandates or otherwise) on actual production history's (APH's).  The plan is that the pilot insurance program will be tried out under a special written agreement in the SD-6 HPA - where a LEMA order is expected soon to restrict their irrigation pumpage to 55 acre-inches over the next 5 years.  Under said agreements a special accounting will be done in regard to the production yields.  Bottom line is that participating producers' yield histories will not be affected during the special program period.

This is a win-win situation in my opinion and I wish to thank RMA and all those involved in offering this program to the SD-6 producers.  It will be interesting to find out how the producers opt to use this program - if at all.  Keep in mind, with the flexibility to use the 55 inches as desired, it is possible that some producers will not need it at all.  For example, those who choose to fully irrigate in 4 of the 5 LEMA years and go to dryland production in the other year will not need it.  On the other hand, anyone planning to use just their 11 acre-inch average allocation per year should be more interested.

There are many other details that are being worked at this time.  I'll try to do another article later on this program as an update. It's great to see the various levels of government supporting the locally developing LEMA plan.

A New Approach To Enhanced Management in Kansas

I'm very happy to announce that our year long effort to pass new legislation in Kansas regarding enhanced management has been successful.  Immediately following the 2012 session, Governor Brownback signed SB 310 - also known as the LEMA Bill - for Local Enhanced Management Areas.

This bill went through the Legislature with only 1 minor hiccup, and was eventually passed unamended - unanimously in the Senate and with only one "nay" vote in the entire House.  I was always confident the bill was well constructed and would pass, but I didn't expect the overwhelming support we got from all the other "water" players in Kansas, the Governor's office and the Legislature.

Basically, the bill authorizes a GMD board to submit an enhanced management plan to the state engineer.  "That doesn't sound too revolutionary to me", you might say.  However, once the absolutely local plan is received, the state engineer gets to reject it outright if it does not pass a set of minimum standards.  The full LEMA process is fairly involved, so this first test is needed by the state to weed out the insincere and/or inadequate proposals.

Assuming the local plan passes initial muster, two hearing processes take place next - the first by an independent hearing officer, and the second, more detailed hearing, by the state engineer.  By law, the hearings are focused solely on the proposed local plan - an important element that insures that local desires are not derailed.  And finally, the state engineer makes one of 4 possible decisions - approve the local plan as presented; reject the plan entirely; return the plan with unconstitutional or illegal elements identified; or return the plan with state suggested amendments that improve the proposal.  In this last option, the state suggested amendments can only be offered if they came up during the hearing process, are not more restrictive than initially proposed, and can be rejected by the GMD 4 board to halt the process.

This approach by no means insures that the locals will get exactly what they want, but it does guarantee they won't get what they don't want.  The fear of unwanted outcomes has, prior to the LEMA approach, prevented many local requests for enhanced management from being started.  It also pretty much requires that the locals, GMD and state engineer to work closely together in culminating any local approach put forward. Finally, the previous approach of using Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCAs), which is significantly more of a state-directed enhanced management approach,  has been retained in its entirety.  With the LEMA authority, the locals now have the first choice of tools to use, but not exclusive command of the enhanced management process.

The GMD 4 board just approved our first LEMA request (SD-6 High Priority Area) which was submitted to the state engineer on July 16.  We're all in uncharted waters, now.  More later.

Let's Take A Step Back And Look Long Term

This hydrograph is from the long term monitoring well located on the Kansas State University Experiment Station just west of Colby, Kansas.  It has been measured since the late 1940's with much of the record having a continuous water level chart available.  When you look closely, you see a pretty steady decline rate since 1959 except for a slight, but noticeable bump starting in 1990 and lasting until 2000.

You should be aware that from 1977 through about 2000 this region went through a remarkable conversion of the irrigation systems used to irrigate local crops - from the traditional flood systems to center pivot systems.  These new systems reported pumping reductions - sometimes up to 30%.

If pumping dropped so significantly, why didn't the water level decline rate slow accordingly?  It only slowed during the 1990's because every year of this decade but for one was above average rainfall.  Pumpage in the 90's was down even more and recharge was up a bit.  As soon as rainfall returned to normal, the decline rate did so as well.

The answer is that the water table decline rate is related solely to consumptive water use, not pumpage.  The high pumpage rates under the older, less-efficient flood irrigation systems also meant more deep percolation - recharge.  When the more efficient irrigation systems came in, less water was pumped, but less water was also recharged - the higher system efficiencies meant that a higher percentage of the pumped water went to crop production and healthier crop canopies.  With slightly higher ET use on slightly reduced irrigated acres, total ET stayed about level.  All this means that consumptive crop water use during this transition was staying about the same - thus the decline rates stayed the same.

The only way in our neck of the woods to slow the decline rate is to reduce consumptive water use - meaning crop ET.  The only way to do this is to grow lower ET crops on the same acres, reduce acres, start deficit irrigating the same acres or some combination of all these things.  As the declines continue and eventually well yields drop off, irrigators will start making these decisions by default and the economic engine of the region will begin to slide down - over time.  This is especially true since all wells will not drop off at the same rate or over the entire region at the same time.  It doesn't make it any better, but the notion that one morning the entire Ogallala will be dewatered and stop producing agricultural irrigation water is far fetched.

This is what the HPA process is all about - allowing local water users to decide to reduce CU earlier in this scenario to extend the economic life of the aquifer as they see fit.  I don't see strongly "right" or "wrong" answers here, just local preferences - IF the locals can publicly make these decisions. Let's hope they can discuss these issues in earnest and chart their best course.

All-In Auction for SD-6?

I've been working some on the design of an all-in auction (AiA - click here for a rudimentary rundown) - as a different way of reallocating a reduced water supply for any particular area, but clearly looking toward consideration by the SD-6 High Priority Area where we need to take some 28,000 AF down to 22,000 AF to meet the locally stated goals.

The simple model I'm ginning up as a test (fake auction) is:  19 water right owners, in priority, owning between 3 and 15 units of water each (1 unit equaling 20 AF).  Total pre-auction units total 150 (3000 AF) and the goal is to auction off a reduced 112 units (2240 AF).  My model is an annual auction format, which would allow a new restricted amount in any (or every) year.

Basically everyone places their units into the auction (thus the name "all-in") and proceeds to bid at least once for every unit they've put in. They can bid as many times as they like and at any dollar value.  Ideally they would value each unit of water within their operation and bid that value or somewhere close to it.  Once all the bids are placed (my scaled down model found the 19 owners of 150 units making just over 220 bids) the awarding process begins.

The bids are sorted from highest to lowest.  The 112 highest bids are awarded and these successful bidders get to use the 112 units next year. Depending on how all the bids go down, some may get more units than placed in, some may get less, some will get the same number and some may not get any at all.  The idea is that those who value the water the highest and can translate their water use into production valued higher than others, will get the water.  In this scheme, the reduced 112 units of water should end up producing more value than if the 112 units were divvied up any other way.  The final step is the accounting.

The unit price of water is fixed at the first, non-successful bid price, and everyone uses this price - be they seller, or buyer.  In my fake auction, the bids ranged from $36,000 to $200 per unit.  The 113th bid price was $11,201 per unit, so this became the unit price.  Those ending up with more units than they put into the auction, pay the auction $11,201 for every extra unit they came away with, while everyone ending up with fewer units received the same amount for each reduced unit.  In the end, the auction will always be revenue neutral.

If you've been reading anything at all about these kinds of auctions you may recognize this as the current work of David Zetland - from Wageningen University in the Netherlands and perhaps others.  (The link above actually takes you to Zetland's blog where he explains the ideas in a helpful video).  Since we must reduce water use in the SD-6 high priority area, I wanted to see if an AiA might be a workable methodology.

While my spreadsheet ran just fine, I have concerns - or perhaps second-level questions - about the concepts.  They are:

1)  I wonder how easy it will be to get 100% of the water right holders in an area to agree to such an auction. It's not that everyone won't be able to determine their unit values in preparation for the bidding, but I fear many will just not want to take the time and effort to do so, so will decide not to agree.

2)  Our wells and water rights in these special areas are pretty well physically maxed out.  I'm afraid most will not have the capability to pump the extra water they may be awarded, so the owners will not tend to bid beyond their own units.  Now, if the wells would go to the successful bidders, too....

3)  We'd likely have to develop special bidding protocols as our water rights are for maximum annual quantities, and would have to be annually restructured for some if not most of the net positive bidders.  We also have variations of annual water rights, like 5-year allocations and term and temporary permits, that would need special bidding rules.  These issues are not insurmountable, but would take extra attention.  A decision to run a 5-year auction time frame might help, but our 5-year allocations are not all the same 5-years.

4)  Seems to me in a groundwater only setting (like ours) the auction area should be small enough to prevent the possibility of an unusually large slug of buyers being able to grossly over pump a specific area. This could cause impairment problems as a result of the different withdrawal patterns.

5)  Our model was restricted only to the current water right owners. This arrangement would be the most likely to be locally acceptable, but I wonder if a better model would be to open up the auction completely.  Maybe the Kansas Wildlife agency would want to bid in order to supply water to enhance stream baseflows or wildlife habitat.  The outside uses of water are potentially endless - but the local users may deeply resent their participation.  (Update (October 17, 2011):  David Zetland recommended initially limiting participation to only the original unit holders, but , suggested that outside participation could be allowed if desired.  It could also be controlled by being limited to a specified percentage of the total auction units. Both good suggestions.) 

6)  Also, not knowing what the unit price is going to be until after the auction runs I think will confound those bidders who are interested in foregoing irrigation and taking the cash instead.  They're going to be very disappointed if the unit price ends up being half or less of what they valued their water at and would have bid if they wanted to retain their own units.  Eventually the market will settle on some fairly narrow values and more people will have a better idea of what to expect, but initially this could be an issue.  Also, I guess it'd be possible to have subsequent bidding rounds to fine tune this situation, but I'm not sure most folks will stay with the process that long.

7)  With water rights in Kansas being property rights to the use of the state's water that can always be bought, sold, leased, traded or whatever, it may be easier for water users in Kansas, once they are required to reduce pumpage, to lease or trade their water among themselves from year to year rather than subscribe to the formality of an AiA.  This arrangement won't necessarily address the production efficiency issues that the AiA does, but it'd be far more familiar to the users.

I do like some elements of this approach, however, like addressing the production efficiencies and the flexibility of changing the goals from timestep to timestep and even the timesteps.  All in all, our planned SD-6 approach of a regulated allocation system (reducing everyone to 55 acreinches per acre over a 5-year period) gets to the same goal with more of a "sharing the pain" flavor than would a fiscally competitive AiA.  There are some operators that simply seem to have more money than others, and I fear will be perceived as having a leg up in an auction setting.  

I think the AiA concept is interesting enough that it should be at least looked at as an alternative reduced water use, enhanced management plan for any area seeking to, or having to reduce water use.

A New Approach to Control Areas In Kansas

We're attempting to get some legislation passed in the upcoming 2012 session regarding control areas.  The current statutes allow intensive groundwater use control areas (IGUCAs) to be formed by state process.  Either a groundwater district can request one of the chief engineer or the chief engineer can initiate one on his or her own.  In either case, once the IGUCA is initiated, there is no telling where it'll end up.  Every or any solution can be put on the table during the public hearing process.  First, the list of corrective control provisions (solutions) allow for adjustments to water rights therein.  Second, the solution itself can be a few mild water right adjustments all the way to severe adjustments that result in aquifer restoration to any historical level.  No doubt about it, under these conditions it's a risky proposition for everyone - except perhaps the chief engineer who makes all the decisions and may or may not have his or her own ideas of what should happen.

Our proposal addresses this single issue.  We're asking that the law be changed such that, within a GMD, if the locally requested control area is proactive, the GMD be authorized to submit a locally developed enhanced management plan along with the control area request. The chief engineer must first rule on the local plan - does it meet minimum standards of a defined, realistic area, include solutions that will address the issues at hand, etc.  If it does, he or she initiates the control area.  The locally developed plan, then, is the sole focus of the public hearing process, and in the end, the chief engineer must either accept the plan (unaltered); reject it totally; return it to the GMD for amendments to bring it into legal compliance; or return it to the GMD with suggestions for improvements (coming only from the public hearing process) that the GMD can accept (then be added to the final order) or reject (stopping the process and withdrawing the original request).  That's about it.

While this approach doesn't guarantee the locals will get what they want, it does guarantee they won't get what they don't want.  It also provides a strong incentive to act locally in the first place - proactively - because this approach is not available if a control area is court ordered, or comes from the state as the result of an impairment complaint or other such action.  It also retains the existing IGUCA process, which can and may be needed if this approach fails for any reason.  It retains a significant level of decision-making in the hands of the chief engineer, and retains full public access to the process.

Couple this process with a suite of other water management incentives being considered for special management areas only, and we design a much more favorable climate for local action than we've ever had before.  If this doesn't work, I'm pretty resigned that a top-down, state approach is the only approach left.

By the way, this new-fangled control area has been dubbed a LEMA - Local Enhanced Management Area - and is looking like it'll get its own statute within the Groundwater Management District Act.  Right now the statutory language is being written collaboratively by the chief engineer, a revisor of statutes within the legislature, and our GMD.  Conceptually, it has been supported by many water groups in the state, but as everyone knows who's been to this rodeo, the devil is always in the final wordsmithing details.

In closing, this approach in no way speaks specifically to what local plans might be put forth for consideration - it merely provides the vehicle.  I'd be interested in any comments you might have - especially if there are deep pitfalls looming.

Limited Irrigation Insurance Coverage?

A number of areas in Kansas are already, or poised soon, to see reduced irrigation applications for crops due to a variety of reasons including regulatory compliance, well yield reductions, groundwater control areas, enhanced management efforts and the like.

Applying less than the full crop water needs is called “limited” or “deficit” irrigation, and Kansas is actually encouraging such irrigation as an important water conservation tool.  Our developing groundwater models are showing us that reduced irrigation can be a significant reduction in water use - and if done correctly can be accomplished with less economic impact than other conservation approaches for the same amount of water savings. I've blogged about this before, but basically the last few acre-inches applied to an irrigated crop are the least profitable, so these are the inches that should be targeted for conservation gains if economic concerns are important.  This means deficit irrigation.

Crop insurance plays a part in all of this because it's an important risk management tool for crop producers.  The problem is, currently there is no crop insurance for limited or deficit irrigation - a field may be insured as fully irrigated or as dryland.  Thus the risk factor of deficit irrigating, if one has to, or purposely chooses to do so, looms large.

Not only does dryland crop insurance not adequately cover the production or revenue losses a producer could face with a limited irrigated crop, but it also doesn’t provide as much collateral for the bank, when seeking next year’s loan, as would occur with a limited irrigated crop insurance.  This alone is another reason to  provide this new tool.

Kansas, along with Nebraska and Colorado, has been working with personnel from the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) Regional Field Office, and the USDA RMA in Kansas City to develop and offer a pilot program of limited irrigation insurance coverage.  The USDA – RMA has given a tentative approval to develop and offer limited irrigated crop insurance in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado, perhaps as soon as 2012, if certain products, procedures and milestones can be met.

Agricultural engineers in all 3 states have developed crop production curve tables, also known as Irrigation Yield Adjustment Tables. These tables are expected to serve for the production guarantee during the transition of getting four or more years of limited irrigated crop harvests.  We are fully supporting RMA's efforts as the enhanced management areas of GMD 4 are going to be instant recipients of the program if they implement their reduced water usage plans in 2012 through 2016.

Reduce...Reduce...Reduce!

I can't tell you how many times I've heard it said, or seen it in writing:  "That area should quit overpumping the groundwater" or something very similar. I'm sure you've heard it too.  Well, any area that has aquifer declines large enough to be that obvious is well beyond sustainable yield.  That's because the well development generally took place decades ago - before groundwater modeling that could predict these impacts became widely used.  In reality the true impacts of well development and groundwater pumping is initially masked and not at all obvious.  Due to the groundwater lag effect, it can take decades before the development starts to affect stream baseflows, which is one way the declines become noticed as serious.  I'd hazzard a guess that in most groundwater overdevelopment cases that are considered serious enough to address, it'd take a minimum of 40% less pumping to even make a dent - and remember, that's once the declines are discovered, quantified, and the permitting of new wells gets properly addressed - if it ever does.

If this is the case, you can see how difficult such a decision would be to any such area. If you can imagine the impact a 40, 50 or 60% reduction in water use within your City or County might have, then maybe you can be a bit more compassionate.  And if you can't imagine such an impact, then you have no business partaking in the discussions.  I can promise you, if it was that easy to do it'd have already been done.  It simply doesn't help to stand out there offering disparaging comments and acting judgmental and disappointed.

We're working on it.  I'd appreciate some honest, well intentioned help, or your quiet understanding.  My phone number is 785-462-3915.  Talk to me!

Groundwater Management

One of the problems of effective groundwater management (assuming you consider groundwater as a more or less common pool resource) is the tendency of individual users to maximize their use in the near-term lest their neighbor(s) beat them to the gains - most often referred to as "the race to the well".  The prior appropriation system of water rights was supposed to address this condition (and many others) by preventing new appropriations whenever they were likely to impair those that already existed.  Thus protected, there is no pressing need to maximize one's gains immediately - at least not because you're afraid your neighbor will get to your expected benefits first. 

However, in an overappropriated prior appropriation system, the race to the well mentality is rekindled - and becomes stronger the more the overappropriation level is.  Of course the question is:  What are the ways this problem can be addressed?  One way is to administer the system by eliminating junior water rights until you're back to sustainable withdrawal levels.  Another way is to recognize the finite timeframe of the current use and convert all existing water rights (from annual authorized quantities) to absolute quantities based on their share of the pool and how long you want the pool to last.  In actuality this resembles an appropriation correlative rights system.

Administering the system will achieve groundwater sustainability, and relieve the need to maximize individual profits before your neighbor does, but it will also never allow the water remaining in storage to be utilized at all.  The only water available is the long-term annual recharge.  Converting all water rights to absolute quantities can allow the system to achieve stabilization at any pre-chosen level - thus allowing the use of as much or as little of the storage as the governing body chooses. 

In cases where the junior water users are the most efficient, the administration approach leaves only the least efficient users left in the system.  The other approach allows everyone to continue pumping to some extent. Moreover, converting all water rights to an absolute total appropriation allows one to save his or her remaining water right for whatever reasons; makes any potential water market more vibrant, allows users to adopt as aggressive of a conservation strategy they choose, and can even incorporate the senior/junior priority system by the relative weighting of all conversions based on priority.  The proposal can also be staged in to encourage and reward early conservation by individual uses or groups of users.  With all these features, it virtually eliminates any need to use your water early (while it doesn't prevent it), and can actually create advantages for saving your water for later use or marketing.  Maybe we'll discuss this more in a later post.

Water Politics - Kansas Style

Kansas will never compete with the hardball nature of water politics ala California or Nevada, but we have our moments.  Take for example the issue of authority over special management areas - dubbed IGUCAs (Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas).  In 1978 the state Legislature amended the groundwater management act to provide new management tools over and above the traditional "administration by priority" when supplies got low.  The actual language says (edited for space):

K.S.A. 82a-1036:  Whenever a GMD recommends the same or whenever a petition signed by not less than three hundred (300) or 5%...of the eligible voters of a GMD, whichever is less, is submitted to the chief engineer, he or she shall initiate...proceedings for the designation of a specifically defined area within such district as an IGUCA. The chief engineer upon his or her own investigation may initiate such proceedings whenever he or she has reason to believe that any...of the following conditions exist in a groundwater use area which is located outside the boundaries of an existing GMD: 

The Legislative debate began with the intent of providing these new management authorities only in the GMDs because the GMDs were asking for them.  Hence the section begins by "Whenever a GMD recommends.."   At the 11th hour, the Legislature amended the bill draft further by adding the last, italicized  sentence - Oh, by the way, outside a GMD the chief engineer can use these tools too, because they are really good tools.  Thus the Legislative intent was:  The chief engineer can initiate an IGUCA within a GMD only upon a recommendation by the GMD, and he or she is free to do so outside a GMD based upon his or her own  study.  The law was read and interpreted by everyone in this manner for the next 24 years. 

In 2002 the attorney general was asked if the chief engineer could initiate an IGUCA within a GMD if the district did not, or would not, request one?  The AG, to everyone's surprise, opined that the chief engineer could indeed do so.  Based on this opinion the chief engineer is now promulgating new regulations to implement this newly conferred authority***.  A few Legislators understand that the AG does not make or change policy or law in the State, but so far this body has not been unable to clarify their 1978 intent - leaving many to ponder their motives.

(*** Clarification - September 11, 2009:   The chief engineer began promulgating 3 separate regulations on IGUCAs following the AG's opinion and other public discussions.  One of these prescribed a procedure for DWR's initiation of an IGUCA within a GMD when not requested by a GMD.  All 3 regulations were heard in public hearing, but the single regulation concerning IGUCAs initiated by the chief engineer inside a GMD when not requested is being withheld and will not be promulgated at this time.)