Watermaster?

There was a recent conclusion by Michael Campana ( AKA Aquadoc) that a federal watermaster should have been appointed in the long-standing Georgia, Florida, Alabama dispute on the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River system. (This picture is my kind of watermaster!). Anyway, normally an appointed watermaster would only administer the final settlement agreement adopted either by mutual agreement of the parties, or the courts. Mr. Campana, however, suggested in this case the watermaster should be appointed early - to help mediate the settlement agreement, then continue on to administer it. On its face, this sounds reasonable enough.

But, some states that have gone through a watermaster situation (Texas and New Mexico on the Rio Grande River) have found out first hand the incredible influence wielded by this person - in essence a lightning rod. And being a federal appointee, this makes the prospect even more problematic for a died-in-the-wool supporter of "states rights" in all things water. And to have such an influence in the settlement development phase prior to the administration phase could be double trouble. I don't think this is as good an idea as it may sound on the surface. If Georgia, Florida and Alabama want to retain the maximum state control over their water resources and uses, the last thing they want is a federal watermaster appointed - for any involvement in this dispute.

To be fair, Mr. Campana recognized my concerns. He wrote: "This step might be viewed as some as an unwarranted Federal intrusion..", and "...is a drastic step, but a watermaster is needed to “persuade’ Alabama, Florida, and Georgia to resolve their differences..". I have to ask: How does appointing a federal watermaster "persuade" these states to solve their differences? It's the proverbial federal foot in the door to influence the process. The threat of placing a watermaster should motivate these states sufficiently - assuming they're not all asleep at the switch. And if after this step they cannot solve their differences? They deserve a federal watermaster and the rest of the US can watch and learn what needs to be avoided - again. I'm going to completley ignore Mr. Campana's recommendation for who his watermaster should be. Talk about lightning rods.

Water's Uniqueness

Scientists currently speak of 66 unique, anomalous traits that water has - including varying density qualities, a large capacity to store heat and a higher surface tension than other liquids. It is a really remarkable substance when you get down on the molecular level.

I would propose a 67th anomalous trait - the ability to stress out everyone and everything that uses it - especially when there is too much or too little of it, it's in the wrong place, comes to us in the wrong form (snow, hail, etc.), gets dirty, is too hot or too cold, has the wrong critters in it, someone wants your share, or others want to tell you how to best use it.

It's managing this stress that makes man's desire to manage water so intense at times. Many claim the next wars will likely be initiated over water - not the normal political/cultural/religious differences we have or any other natural resources such as oil & natural gas, precious metals or gems, etc. It's hard to say if this will be borne out, as others argue for an equal probabilty that water differences will lead to cooperative solutions because it is so universally fundamental and unique. My guess is..., I'd better not say.

Anyway, I have a feeling we're not done discovering the true uniqness of water yet, or the creativity man will apply to manage it - for themselves or for you.

Modflow Modeling in NW Kansas

Our GMD just started using a Modflow groundwater model developed by Steve Larson of S.S. Papadopolos, Inc. Actually, it is a converted version of the Republican River Compact model co-developed by the states of Kansas, Colorado and Nebraska under order of the US Supreme Court as part of the compact settlement stipulation. We have run about 6 different scenarios - 1 representing continued pumping as in the past (status quo) and 5 scenarios of reduced irrigation pumpage in our 6 designated high priority areas (HPAs). One of these runs was no irrigation pumpage at all in the 6 HPAs.

The status quo was, well, status quo. The water table declines continued downward over the next 60 years on an very consistent trend as we've seen in the past 40 years. The various percentage reductions (90%, 70%, 50%, 20%) showed virtually proportional trends for each run. It was the zero pumpage run that showed some interesting results.

For this run (100% reduction of irrigation water pumpage) the water levels in all 6 HPA's drifted upward (negative decline) for about 20 years, then started a much slower decline trend for the last 40 years - to finish 60 years out at slightly below the model starting levels. The model is likely telling us that halted pumpage immediately benefits the specific region that does it (for about 20 years) as the long term pumping cone fills back in. Eventually, the pumpage outside the HPA (which continued the entire time in excess of safe yield) begins to affect the HPA causing it to begin to decline again, but at a much slower rate.

The model confirms the common notion that the very slow rate of groundwater movement will find all benefits of an area's reduced pumpage accruing to that specific area for about 2 decades. Our next step is to couple an economic model to tell us the economic impacts of reducing any pumpage rate by any specific method. We feel that if there are 4 ways to reduce pumpage by 30%, for example, the economic impacts are likely to vary between the methods. It'll be fun and games for a while in GMD 4.

Can't Help But Shake My Head!

Peter Gleick of the Pacific Institute has been defending irrigation efficiency improvements as a significant part of the water supply crisis of CA. Just today he Blogged:

Two separate companies that manufacture state-of-the-art irrigation efficiency technology have approached me and lamented the difficulty of working in California, where they feel irrigation districts and farm lobbyists work to hinder efforts to improve efficiency, rather than help farmers seeking to improve water use.

I agree with these folks most of the time, but on this issue I really believe they are not right. There are too many reports, models and studies out there that conclude the exact opposite - an increase of consumptive water use upon the adoption of such technology.

Pfeiffer & Lin (University of California, Davis); Samani and Skaggs (New Mexico State University); Amosson & Almos & Golden (Ogallala Aquifer Initiative); Kendy (Montana Hydrogelologist); Bredehoeft (1997); and others have all come to the same conclusion - increased water use efficiency increases consumptive water use. It's not the technology that makes this happen, but the inability of the water managers to recognize it and compensate appropriately. Of course any mandated reduction in irrigated areas, or mandatory cropping restrictions, or irrigation scheduling needed to offset the reduced recharge and higher CU will have economic, social and legal consequences, but these are easy to get by, right? Probably NOT. Anyway, I hope we don't pin our future water supply hopes too much on improved irrigation technology until we're sure of the sacrifices needed to accomplish it.

AWEP Misses the Conservation Mark

A week or so ago NRCS announced that the Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (AWEP) approved 63 conservation proposals in 21 states committing just over $57 million. AWEP is supposed to provide financial and technical assistance to farmers and ranchers to improve water conditions on their land to protect and preserve U.S. water resources - or so the press release states.

Many of the approved proposals are going to improve irrigation efficiency. We already know that this more often than not leads to slightly higher consumptive water use - even if total pumpage decreases. Some of the largest proposals are in states that do not control new development, so even if some conservation were to occur, what's to stop new development from offsetting what our tax dollars pay to conserve? Many of the approved proposals are not in any of the eight designated priority areas.

The good news seems to be that 3 or 4 of the approved proposals actually plan to return irrigated land to dry land production - a very good conservation effort. However, the press release does not tell us if these are permanent or temporary conversions, or, if the payments are based on actual used water or a combination of used water and "paper" water rights. These details need to be known to accurately assess the conservation we'll really get from these efforts.

Based on these realities, AWEP is almost assured of spending a lot of money for not as much long term conservation as we could have had. We're also aware of at least 3 proposals that did not get approved which were for permanent conversions of irrigated land to dryland, based on actual historical use, in administratively closed areas (no new water rights allowed) and within one of the designated high priority areas. Yet somehow these proposals did not compete well.

There should be a serious accounting called for on this program before next year's increased allotment of $76 million gets doled out.

Water Use Efficiency? Maybe Not.

Most people and governments are supportive of and even promoting irrigation water use efficiency as a way to conserve water. Take an old gravity irrigation system applying 1000 gallons of water on an irrigated patch. This 65% efficient irrigation system will consumptively use (transpire and evaporate) only 650 gallons of the 1000 pumped and applied. The rest deep percolates below the root zone to rejoin the groundwater table (a non-consumptive use). So, 650 gallons are annually used consumptively (lost to the hydro system).

The irrigator is now paid a nice government incentive ($48K - $400 an acre on 120 acres - a typical Kansas incentive rate) to upgrade to a new, 90% efficient pivot so he can conserve water. He now pumps and applies only 850 gallons to the same patch - a 15% reduction (conservation). The new system now allows the crop to transpire and evaporate 90% of the pumped water while eliminating the inefficient water use (deep percolation) totally. This government incentive has just allowed the user to increase his consumptive draw on the aquifer from 650 gallons annually to 765 gallons each year (90% of 850 gallons). While inefficient water use is eliminated, and the pumped water is reduced 15%, the consumptive water use (CU) actually increases. Believe it or not, the change in the water table of a typical aquifer system changes as a result of consumptive water use, not gross pumpage. This conversion will actually increase the groundwater decline rate - all else being equal.

As if this were not bad enough, how many pivot conversions actually irrigated more acres than the original flood system? If land is available, we usually find a 15% increase in land when 15% more water becomes available due to efficiency improvements. And every newly irrigated acre increases consumptive use above the numbers discussed here.

Without clear and restrictive polices to control irrigated acres as system conversions are being made, consumptive use will tend strongly to increase as a result. And even if CU doesn't actually increase, it usually doesn't go down much at all. And even if it does happen to drop a bit, the system pays a premium for the 1-2% reduction which is easily offset by most of the other conversions that increase CU. This is a very inefficient way to seek water conservation.

Public Interest and Takings

As water becomes more scarce and more sought after, managers and governments are going to get more creative in their pursuits. One creative way to change the system is to redefine the basic foundations of water law. One of those foundations is the concept of "public interest" - probably the least well-defined term in today's water law, certainly in Kansas water law.

Everyone has a notion of what the public interest is, and in Kansas water law it is very loosely defined. Therein lies the problem (opportunity). Want to eliminate inefficient ag water use so it can be used for public water supply? Define or litigate it as not being in the public interest. Done. Whatever you (or a water manager or a government) wants to do with the water, redefining "public interest" can achieve it without even changing any water law.

Another example is current S. 787 now going through Congress. The clean water act currently applies to "navigable waters of the U.S.". S. 787 redefines applicable water to simply "waters of the U.S.". Such a simple redefinition, that once done, will place all waters of the U.S. under federal regulatory control. I'm not saying this will be a good thing or bad thing - only that it will change the regulatory water focus of the federal government significantly.

The only saving grace in this approach to shifting water use is that because a redefinition of "public interest" is made, it's virtually impossible to argue that the shift is for any other reason than to satisfy the public interest. This means that regulatory (or actual) takings now becomes a real secondary issue.

But regardless of the methods used, I think the posturing for control of water is only going to get way more interesting.